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Promised Land or Land of Broken
Promises? Political Asylum in the
United States
Give me your tired, your poor, Your huddled masses
yearning to breathe free, The wretched refuse of your
teeming shore, Send these, the homeless, temptest-
tossed, to me: I lift my lamp beside the golden door *
INTRODUCTION
Many refugees' seek political asylum2 in the United States.
3
Although historically refugees have come from outside our hem-
isphere, 4 the more recent influx of aliens claiming refugee status
* Inscription on the Pedestal of the Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor,
written by Emma Lazarus.
For a definition of refugee, see mfra note 51 and accompanying text. Although
figures vary, the number of refugees in the world is estimated to be between 11 and 13
million persons. M. LEMAY, FROM OPEN DOOR TO DUTCH DOOR: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLCY SncE 1820 121 (1987) (worldwide refugee population estimated
between 12 and 13 million); Statement by Secretary Schultz, DEP'T ST. BULL., Vol. 87,
No. 2128, p. 47 (November 1987)(Secretary Schultz estimates worldwide refugee popu-
lation to be over 11 million).
2 Applications for political asylum are governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982) and
8 C.F.R. § 208 (1987). For a discussion of the technical aspects of a request for political
asylum, see infra notes 84-120 and accompanying text.
There were more than 16,622 applications for political asylum filed in 1985.
STATISTICS Div., IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERv (INS) asylum cases filed with
district directors, table dated Oct. 23, 1985. In addition, 126,000 other applications were
still pending at the end of Fiscal Year 1985. Preston, Asylum Adjudications: Do State
Department Advisory Opinions Violate Refugees' Rights and U.S. International Obli-
gations?, 45 MD. L. REv 91 (1986). One of the reasons for the large number of pending
applications is the inefficiency of the INS in processing applications. For example, in
1981, the INS decided 50 asylum requests, leaving a backlog in excess of 5000 cases. M.
LEMAY, supra note 1, at 132. For a discussion of these problems of the INS, see id. at
125-36. Prior to the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, there was no formal process
for aliens in the United States to request political asylum. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107
S. Ct. 1207, 1211 n.4 (1987). One of the purposes of the 1980 Act was "to provide a
permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees."
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
1 Kurzban, A Critical Analysis of Refugee Law, 36 U. Mtin L. Rav 865, 867-
69 (1981-82).
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is from within the western hemisphere.5 This new development
has caused a variety of problems, both legal6 and political, 7 for
the federal government.8
Prior to the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980,9 attempts
to deal with problems of refugees were made on an ad-hoc
basis,' 0 the primary goal being to aid those fleeing from govern-
ments which the United States opposed." The major objective
of the Refugee Act was to make asylum decisions on a politically
neutral basis. 12 This goal has not been reached, however, as
asylum claims are still determined primarily by American polit-
ical interests. 3 For example, since 1980, aliens fleeing communist
governments are still more likely to have their political asylum
claims granted.'
4
First, this Note examines the statutory15 and adnimistrative 6
framework for the processing of asylum claims. Then, the role
of the judiciary in overseeing this process is discussed. 7 Finally,
Preston, supra note 3, at 120; see M. LEMAY, supra note 1, at 120-23.
6 Panel Discussion, 36 U. MiAw L. REv. 939, 941-68 (1981-82).
' Id.
I One of the more publicized problems has been how to handle the existence of
a sanctuary movement in the United States. Sanctuary workers aid illegal aliens fleeing
from Central America. For a discussion of sanctuary, see generally Carro, Sanctuary:
The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned
Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. QN. L. REv 747 (1986); Ryan, The Historical Case for the
Right of Sanctuary, 29 J. CHURCH & STATE 209 (1987); Zall, Asylum and Sanctuary:
The American Dilemma, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 66.
9 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
10 Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36 U. Munm
L. REv 819 (1981-82).
Id. at 847.
,2 Kurzban, supra note 4, at 878. The legislative history of the Refugee Act did
indicate, however, that the United States would be most concerned with refugees from
countries where the United States had strong historical and cultural ties. This interest
would continue in order to promote family reumons, respond to human rights, and
fulfill foreign policy objectives. S. REP No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1980). This
seems to indicate that members of Congress realized it would be impossible to totally
eliminate foreign policy considerations in the asylum process.
13 Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise,
17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 243 (1983-84).
14 See infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
"1 See mfra notes 20-83 and accompanying text.
,6 See infra notes 84-120 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 121-66 and accompanying text.
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the Note concludes that the Refugee Act of 1980 has not suc-
ceeded in creating a politically neutral process for the granting
of asylum claims."' Changes are suggested which might effectuate
this goal.' 9
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF REFUGEE LAW
A. Refugee Law Prior to 1980
Historically, refugee law has been characterized by ad-hoc
decision making. 0 The admission of refugees into the Umted
States traditionally has been dealt with through the political
process.2' Early statutes clearly favored refugees from communist
countries.22 Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980,23 American refugee
law reflected a concern with political ideology rather than hu-
manity 2
Several early statutes specifically referred to political ideol-
ogy z For example, the purpose of the Displaced Persons Act
of 19482 was to aid persons "fleeing Fascist or Soviet persecu-
tion. "27 In addition, the Refugee Relief Act of 195328 served to
,8 See infra notes 167-93 and accompanying text.
,9 See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
20 Scanlan, supra note 10, at 847
21 Kurzban, supra note 4, at 867-78. In particular, under section 212(d)(5) of the
Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952, the Attorney General could permit aliens to be
paroled into the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1982). This section was amended
in 1980 by adding a new section to reflect changes brought by the Refugee Act of 1980.
For the text of the current statute, see infra note 33.
22 Kurzban, supra note 4 at 867-68.
23 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
24 See generally Helton, supra note 13; Kurzban, supra note 4; Posner, Comments
and Recommendations on Proposed Reforms to United States Immigration Policy, 36
U. MAMn L. Rav 883 (1981-82); Preston, supra note 3, at 91-95; Scanlan, supra note
10.
2 See Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), as amended
by Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262, 64 Stat. 219 (1950); Act of June 28, 1951, ch. 167,
65 Stat. 96 (1951) (repealed 1957); Refugee Relief Act of 1953, ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400
(1953), as amended by Act of Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1169, 68 Stat. 1044 (1954); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1153(a)(7) (1980).
Ch. 647, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948), as amended by Act of June 16, 1950, ch. 262,
64 Stat. 219 (1950); Act of June 28, 1951, ch. 167, 65 Stat. 96 (1951) (repealed 1957).
Kurzban, supra note 4, at 868.
Ch. 336, 67 Stat. 400 (1953), as amended by Act of Aug. 31, 1954, ch. 1169,
68 Stat. 1044 (1954).
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"expedite the admission of refugees" from communist coun-
tries.29 In 1952, "refugee" was defined to explicitly include
people fleeing communist regimes. 30 This preference continued
throughout later amendments.
31
Ideological preferences were illustrated by three methods used
to admit refugees or to allow refugees to remain in the United
States: parole, withholding of deportation, and political asy-
lum. 32 The parole authority3 allows presidents to permit large
numbers of aliens into the United States. 34 For example, this
power was used to admit 31,000 Hungarian refugees in 1956 and
1957,35 690,000 Cuban refugees between 1962 and 1979,36 and
more than 200,000 refugees from Indo-China between 1975 and
1979 37 As a general rule, however, presidents have not used the
parole power to admit refugees from nations with close ties to
the United States. 38
29 Kurzban, supra note 4, at 868. The statute provided: "[T]he term 'refugee-
escapee' means any alien who, because of persecution or fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, or political opinion has fled or shall flee (A) from any Communist,
Commurst-dommated, or Communist-occupied area." Id. at 868 n.22 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
at § 1153(a)(7) (1980)).
30 Id. at 869.
31 Id.
32 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)-(B) (1982) (parole); id. at § 1253(h)(1)-(2) (withholding
deportation); Pub. L. No. 96-212 (political asylum).
33 (5)(A) The Attorney General may, except as provided in subparagraph
(B), in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such
conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed
strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United
States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission
of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of
the Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or
be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his
case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any
other applicant for admission to the United States.
(B) The Attorney General may not parole into the United States an
alien who is a refugee unless the Attorney General determines that com-
pelling reasons in the public interest with respect to that particular alien
require that the alien be paroled into the United States rather than be
admitted as a refugee under section 1157 of this title.
8 U.S.C. at § 1182(d)(5)(A)-(B).
" Kurzban, supra note 4, at 870-71.
Id. at 871.
36 Id. An additional 124,786 Cubans came from Mariel in 1980, and most of them
were admitted under the parole authority. Id. at 871 n.32.
1 Id. at 872.
38 Id.
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The criteria for withholding deportation has broadened over
time. 9 Originally, deportation was withheld only if the alien
would be subjected to "physical persecution" upon returning to
his or her homeland. 40 The standard was later broadened to
include "persecution on account of race, religion, or political
opimon, ' ' 41 and was further expanded by the Refugee Act of
1980.42
Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, political asylum was an
informal and ad-hoc process, 43 existing only in the administrative
regulations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 44
The Refugee Act of 1980 formalized and structured the process
of granting asylum.
45
B. The Refugee Act of 198016
The purpose of the Refugee Act of 1980 was to fulfill obli-
gations under international law47 by making domestic law con-
5' The current version of the statute regarding deportation reads as follows:
(h) Withholding of deportation or return
(1) The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien
(other than an alien described in section 1251(a)(19) of this title) to a
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or polit-
ical opinion.
(2) Paragraph (I) shall not apply to any alien if the Attorney
General determines that-
(A) the alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise partici-
pated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion;
(B) the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
the United States;
(C) there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has
committed a serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States
prior to the amval of the alien in the Umted States; or
(D) there are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
danger to the security of the United States.
8 U.S.C. at § 1253(h)1l)-(2).
, Kurzban, supra note 4, at 873.
" Id. at 874.
• See infra notes 46-67 and accompanying text.
" Kurzban, supra note 4, at 875 n.61.
Id. at 875.
" See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
41 Pub. L. No. 96-212.
-' Senate Report No. 96-256 stated the new refugee definitions brought U.S. law
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sistent with the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees. 48 In 1968 the United States agreed to this Protocol,
which bound the parties to certain provisions of the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 49 The
most important provision in the Protocol is the definition of a
refugee, 50 Refugee is defined as an individual who
[o]wing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his na-
tionality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it.
5
When the United States agreed to the above Protocol, the
President and the Senate apparently thought there was no need
to change existing law to be consistent with this definition of
refugee. 52 At most, it was thought that any necessary modifica-
tions could be made through the administration of refugee claims
by the Attorney General. 53 Commentators have argued that the
United States did not understand the effect of this new definition
of refugee. 54 As one commentator has stated:
It took years for the United States to realize the effect of this
new definition. Between 1968 and 1980, the immigration laws
were in disarray For example, in the early 1970's a Lithuanian
seaman named Simar Kudirka jumped off a Soviet trawler and
was plucked from the sea by either the United States Coast
Guard or Navy Not knowing what to do with him, the rescuers
into conformity with U.S. international treaty obligations. S. REP No. 256, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1980); see also U.S. v. Elder, 601 F Supp. 1574, 1581 (SD. Tex. 1985).
Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
, The United States was not a signatory to the Convention. INS v. Stevie, 467
U.S. 407, 416 n.9 (1984).
-o Helton, supra note 13, at 250-51.
1 This definition is in article 1.2 of the Protocol.
52 Stevic, 467 U.S. at 417 (The President and Senate believed the protocol was
largely consistent with existing law.).
13 Id. at 417-18.
'4 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 24, at 884.
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informed Washington that Mr. Kudirka was saying something
about asylum. They must have contacted someone at the Im-
nugration and Naturalization Service (INS) which, at the time,
had neither procedures nor forms for asylum requests. Nobody
knew how to deal with Mr. Kudirka's asylum request, so the
United States sent him back to the Soviet Umon. The Soviets,
in turn, sent Mr. Kudirka to Siberia.
Members of Congress were disturbed about this incident"5
and demanded that the United States create an asylum proce-
dure. So the Immigration and Naturalization Service created a
form, number 1-589 But between 1971, when Kudirka was sent
back to the Soviet Union, and 1980, when the Refugee Act of
1980 was passed, no one quite knew what to do with the form.
The INS promulgated some regulations, but nothing in the im-
migration laws addressed asylum." Finally, members of Con-
gress, disillusioned with the ability of the INS and the Justice
Department to fulfill the spirit of the Protocol,5 enacted the
Refugee Act of 1980.58
Motivated by humanitarian concerns, 9 Congress liberalized
the definition of refugee. 60 A refugee was defined as one who
was unable or unwilling to return to his or her country "because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion."
' 6'
The procedure for resolving asylum claims was also estab-
lished in the 1980 Act, which gives the Attorney General the
power to establish a procedure for aliens to apply for asylum.
The Attorney General is authorized to grant asylum, in his or
15 Many commentators state this incident led members of Congress to be more
concerned with the actions of the INS. See, eg., Preston, supra note 3, at 98-99.
56 Posner, supra note 24, at 884-85.
', Helton, supra note 13, at 249-50.
, Id. The Senate Report on the Refugee Act of 1980 stated the new law was to
"give[ ] statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and humam-
tarian concerns." S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1-3.
' Scanlan, supra note 10, at 855; see S. REP No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at I-
3.
" Scanlan, supra note 10, at 853 n.146.
61 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1982). This definition conforms to the language in
article 1.2 of the Protocol. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
1987-88]
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her discretion, if the alien meets the new definition of a refugee. 62
The 1980 Act also amended the Attorney General's authority to
withhold deportation under section 243(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952.63 This amendment removed the
Attorney General's discretion in deciding whether to withhold
deportation, and required the Attorney General not to deport
or return any alien if that alien's life or freedom would be
threatened on "account of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion." 64 The
amendment was also passed in order to comply with United
States Protocol obligations requiring a state not to expel or
return a refugee when his or her life or freedom would be
endangered on grounds stated in the amendment. 65
Although Congress clearly intended the Refugee Act of 1980
to remove the ideological bias in admitting refugees,6 the Act
did not define the standard for determining refugee admission. 67
As a result, there has been a continuing controversy over the
proper standard for processing claims under section 208(a)68 and
section 243(h). 69 Some commentators believe this omission al-
lowed what was to be a neutral process to be subverted into a
process domnnated by political and ideological biases.
70
The INS believed that there was no difference between the
standard to be used for processing asylum claims and requests
for the withholding of deportation.7 ' The INS adopted a stan-
dard that required the refugee, in either case, to prove a "clear
probability of persecution.''72 It was apparent, however, that
6 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982).
61 Id. at § 1253(h). The earlier statute had stated the Attorney General could
withhold deportation if the alien would be "subject to persecution on account of race,
religion, or political opinion and for such period of time as he deems to be necessary
for such reason." Id. at § 1253 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
61 This broadens the reasons for withholding deportation.
61 19 U.S.T. at 6276; see Stevic, 467 U.S. at 416-17
" Kurzban, supra note 4, at 867
67 Id.
1 This section contains the definition of refugee embodied in 8 U.S.C. at §
1101(a)(42)(A).
69 This section is the withholding of deportation provision codified at d. at §
1253(h).
10 See generally Kurzban, supra note 4; Preston, supra note 3.
11 Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct.
1207 (1987).
72 Stevic, 467 U.S. at 424.
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this standard was more lenient in some cases than in others. 73
Over time, courts began to oversee the process, and the standard
began to change. Two standards eventually emerged, one appli-
cable to each process. 74 Claims under section 243(h) (withholding
deportation) were determined by a "clear probability of
persecution" 75 while requests under section 208(a) (political asy-
lum) were governed by a "well-founded fear of persecution.
' 76
The courts of appeal were divided over this issue,7 7 however,
and confusion regarding the appropriate standard to be applied
resulted. 7 The Supreme Court has attempted to resolve this
confusion, 79 although some controversy continues. 0 The Court
held the "well-founded fear" standard applies to section 208
proceedings" while the "clear probability" standard applies to
section 243(h) proceedings.1
2
II. ADMNSTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR POLinCAL ASYLUM
CLAIMS
The procedures for processing political asylum claims are
contained in 8 C.F.R. § 208.83 The political asylum application,
73 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
74 Helton, supra note 13, at 252-53.
75 The clear probability standard was very difficult to meet. One district director
was quoted as saying, "If we use [it] all the time, no one would be given asylum." Id.
at 253. Another INS official gave an example of a claim that was demed under the
standard:
The claimant said is father was murdered. He had a newspaper article
showing a picture of someone he said was his father and two other men
in Iran being lynched. But I don't know if it's his father. He's also got
an affidavit from a friend who was present describing the executions. But
the friend could be lying.
Id.
76 Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986) (Well-founded fear
standard has both an objective and a subjective part-the alien's fear must be justified,
and persecution must be a reasonable possibility.).
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. 1207, 1210 (1987); Stevic, 467 U.S. at 413.
The Court stated in both of these cases that it granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
between the circuit courts on these issues.
1, Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1210.
71 Id. at 1222.
"0 See infra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
" Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1211-22.
" Stevic, 467 U.S. at 413-30.
,1 These regulations are pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). The INS recently
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made on Form 1-589, 84 may include the applicant, as well as the
applicant's spouse and children .85 The application is made either
to an INS district director 86 or to an immigration judge if exclu-
sion or deportation proceedings have begun.87 Requests for po-
litical asylum made to an immigration judge are also considered
to be requests for the withholding of exclusion or deportation
under section 243(h).
88
The applicant has the burden of proving either persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution 9 because of "race, relig-
ion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion." 9° The regulation does not distinguish stan-
dards for claims under section 243(h) and section 208(a).91
When application for political asylum is made to the district
director, the applicant must request an advisory opinion from
the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humam-
tarian Affairs (BHRHA).92 There is continuing controversy over
the role of these opinions in granting political asylum.93 Many
commentators argue that the opinions allow the State Depart-
ment to subvert the neutral principles behind the Refugee Act
of 1980.94 Arthur C. Helton, Director of the Political Asylum
Project for the Lawyer's Committee for International Human
Rights, argues that aliens fleeing from communist countries are
far more likely to be granted asylum than those fleeing from
regimes supported by the United States-'"irrespective of their
proposed new regulations which would take immigration judges out of the political
asylum process. After significant opposition to these proposed regulations, they were
withdrawn, and the INS is redrafting new proposed regulations. For a discussion of
these proposed regulations, see Helton, Proposed Regulations on Asylum: An Improve-
ment or Retrogression, NAT'L L.J. Feb. 8, 1988, at 18 (Helton also argues asylum claims
should be removed from the INS and given to a separate agency.).
- 8 C.F.R. § 208.2 (1987).
" Id.
Id. at § 208.3(a).
Id. at § 208.3(b).
98 Id.
11 For a discussion of the two standards, see infra notes 123-62 and accompanying
text.
90 8 C.F.R. at § 208.5.
91 Id.
Id. at § 208.7.
93 See, e.g., Preston, supra note 3.
94 See infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
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human rights records." 95 Helton, quoting from an internal INS
report which substantiates the importance of the State Depart-
ment in these decisions,9 6 states:
In some cases, different levels of proof are required of differ-
ent asylum applicants. In other words, certain nationalities
appear to benefit from presumptive status, while others do
not. For example, for an El Salvadoran national to receive a
favorable advisory opinion, he or she must have a "classic
textbook case." On the other hand [the State Department]
sometimes recommends favorable action where the applicant
cannot meet the individual well-founded fear of persecution
test. This happened in December 1981 a week after martial
law was declared in Poland. Seven Polish crewmen jumped
ship and applied for asylum in Alaska. Even before seeing the
asylum applications, a State Department official said "We're
going to approve them." All the applicatons, in the view of
the INS semor officials, were extremely weak. In one instance,
the crewman said the reason he feared returning to Poland
was that he had once attended a Solidarity rally (he was one
of the more than 100,000 participants at the rally). The crew-
man had never been a member of Solidarity, never participated
in any political activity, etc. His claim was approved within 48
hours. 9
7
Other commentators argue, however, that the State Depart-
ment is better equipped to evaluate an alien's request for asylum
since the Department is most aware of the political and social
events taking place in any given country 98 Rudolph W Giuliani
argues that the State Department serves as the "eyes and ears
[of the United States] in the rest of the world." 99 Consequently,
the BHRHA report must be carefully considered in asylum
cases.1l 0 Regardless of whether it should be, the State Depart-
ment is involved in this process. The district director will not
make a decision until he or she has received the BHRHA report.
91 Helton, supra note 13, at 253-54.
9 Id.
Id. at 254 (quoting Immigration and Naturalization Service, Asylum Adjudica-
tions: An Evolving Concept and Responsibility for the INS, 59n (1982)).
" Panel Discussion, supra note 6, at 939.
9 Id.
o00 Id.
1987-88]
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The district director has the discretion either to grant or to
deny a request for asylum.' 0' The decision, which must be in
writing, 10 2 may not be appealed. 03 If the decision is based upon
the BHRHA opinion, however, that opinion, unless classified,'4
becomes part of the record. The applicant then has an oppor-
tunity to "inspect, explain, and rebut the opinion."'10 5 Asylum
is granted for a period of one year. °6 If the application for
asylum is denied, 10 7 the alien may renew the request "before an
immigration judge in exclusion or deportation proceedings."'' 0 8
Asylum requests before an immigration judge, also made on
Form 1-589, are processed in almost the same way as those
before the district director. The judge must also request a
BHRHA opinion, °9 unless such an opinion was already re-
quested and received in an earlier proceeding. 1 0 The judge may
request a second opinion, however, when circumstances in the
specific country have substantially changed and when the second
opinion would "materially aid" the decision-making process."'
Evidence may be presented to the judge by both parties."
2
The INS may present classified evidence off the record."' The
applicant must be informed of the character of this evidence,1
4
and the judge may disclose this evidence to a limited degree.
15
The judge's decision to grant or deny asylum" 6 may be appealed
101 8 C.F.R. at § 208.8(a).
"0 Id. at § 208.8(b).
,01 Id. at § 208.8(c).
,o, Id. at § 208.8(d).
105 Id.
106 Id. at § 208.8(e). After this one year, the applicant may apply and qualify for
permanent residence status under id. at § 209.2. Asylum can also be terminated under
id. at § 208.15-if conditions have changed in the applicant's homeland, if the applicant
poses a threat to United States security, or if the applicant was not eligible for asylum
in the prior proceeding.
I- Id. at § 208.8(0.
M Id. at § 208.9.
109 Id. at § 208.10(b).
o10 Id.
"I Id.
12 Id. at § 208.10(c).
13 Id.
114 The applicant must be told if the evidence relates to the "political, social, or
other conditions" of a country or if the evidence relates to the individual applicant. Id.
'i Id. at § 208.10(d).
,6 If granted asylum, the applicant may eventually qualify for permanent status
under id. at § 209.2.
[VOL. 76
POLITcAL ASYLUM
to the appropriate court of appeal.1 1 7 Such an appeal, however,
is taken under traditional administrative law procedures. 118
III. JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE PROCEDURE FOR POLITICAL
AsYLUM
The major controversy in asylum cases based on section
208(a), and in the withholding of deportation cases based on
section 243(h), has been the appropriate standard for determin-
ing the merits of the claims. Although this controversy existed
prior to the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980,119 it was limited
to determimng the appropriate standard for section 243(h)
claims. 120 Since 1980, however, two additional issues have
emerged. First, what is the standard for section 208(a) claims?;
and second, did the Refugee Act of 1980 change the standard
of review for section 243(h) claims? It is necessary to examine
each of these standards separately, and then determine whether
the two standards are meaningfully different.
A. The Well-Founded Fear of Persecution Standard in Section
208(a)
The "well-founded fear" standard emerges from the defini-
tion of a refugee, 121 which requires an alien claiming refugee
status to be unwilling to return to his or her homeland because
of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. "Fear of
persecution" appears to require a subjective test-the refugee
must be actually afraid that he or she will be persecuted upon
returmng home. 122 "Well-founded fear," however, appears to
'7 Before an appeal is made to the court of appeals, there is an administrative
appeal before the Board of Immigration Appeals. Id. at §§ 3.0-.8.
" See, e.g., Shahandeh-Pey v. INS, 831 F.2d 1384 (7th Cir. 1987). The Court held
it was required to reverse the Board's decision if the decision was "arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion." Id. at 1387. The Board's action is to be upheld unless "it
was made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies,
or resulted from an impermissible bias such as invidious discrimination against a partic-
ular race or group." Id. (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d 1260, 1265-66
(7th Cir. 1985)).
"I INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 415-20 (1984).
12 Id. at 416-20.
121 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1987).
M Vides-Vides v. INS, 783 F.2d 1463, 1469 (9th Cir. 1986).
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require an objective test-the alien's fear must be reasonable.'2
The Umted States Supreme Court considered the above issue
in INS v Cardoza-Fonseca.124 Luz Marina Cardoza-Fonseca, a
citizen of Nicaragua, came to the United States as a visitor in
1979 The INS began deportation proceedings against her when
she overstayed her visit and refused to depart voluntarily 12.
Conceding she was an illegal alien, Cardoza-Fonseca requested
relief under section 208(a) and section 243(h), alleging she would
be persecuted and her life would be threatened if she were
returned to Nicaragua. Her claim was primarily based upon the
activities of her brother, who had been tortured and imprisoned
in Nicaragua because of his political views. Since the Sandinistas 1
26
knew that she and her brother had fled together, Cardoza-
Fonseca feared she would be tortured and interrogated as to her
brother's whereabouts if she returned to Nicaragua. She did
admit, however, that she had never been politically active her-
self.,27
The immigration judge found Cardoza-Fonseca had not
shown a clear probability of persecution, and, therefore, was
not entitled to relief under either section 208(a) or section 243(h).
The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding these
two sections were governed by different standards and the im-
migration judge had been mistaken in evaluating both claims
under the "clear probability" standard. 28 The Supreme Court
affirmed, finding the section 243(h) standard does not govern
asylum claims under section 208(a). 129
12 Id.
124 107 S. Ct. 1207 (1987).
12 Voluntary departure is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982).
126 The Nicaraguans who overthrew the Somoza regime in 1979 were members of
the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Their name is in honor of Augusto
Ce'sar Sandino, who led a guerrilla movement against United States Marines from 1927
until 1933 when the troops were withdrawn from Nicaragua. Sandino was assassinated
in 1934. For a discussion of the Sandinistas, see O'Brien, God and Man in Nicaragua,
258-2 TEE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 50 (1986); Kornbluh, Sandino's Legacy, reprinted in
UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST SERVICE COMMITTEE, A JOURNEY TO UNDERSTANDING 183 (rev.
ed. 1987).
I" Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1209-10.
In8 Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 107 S.
Ct. 1207 (1987).
329 Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1212-13.
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The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, 130 found
that Congress intended the two proceedings to be governed by
different standards, 31 and that the clear meaning of the statutory
language in section 208(a) is that the "well-founded fear of
persecution" standard applies. 32 Contrasting the language of
section 208(a) with section 243(h), Justice Stevens wrote:
The "would be threatened" language of § 243(h) has no sub-
jective component, but instead requires the alien to establish
by objective evidence that it is more likely than not that he or
she will be subject to persecution upon deportation. In
contrast, the reference to "fear" m the § 208(a) standard
obviously makes the eligibility deterunation turn to some
extent on the subjective mental state of the alien.
The different emphasis of the two standards is signif-
icantly highlighted by the fact that the same Congress simul-
taneously drafted § 208(a) and amended § 243(h). In doing so,
Congress chose to maintain the old standard in § 243(h), but
to incorporate a different standard in § 208(a).1
33
The majority also found the legislative history of section 208(a)
to support the application of two different standards. 34 The
additional arguments offered by the government were found to
be unpersuasive.
13
1
Justice Powell dissented, 136 finding that there was no practical
distinction between the above two standards. 37 Justice Powell
130 The opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Con-
nor.
'" Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1213.
,,2 Id. at 1222.
"I Id. at 1212-13.
,14 Id. at 1213-19.
"I The Government had argued that the structure of the Act required a decision
in its favor since it did not make sense that section 208(a), which provides greater
benefits than section 243(h), would have a lower standard. The Court stated this
argument failed because an alien who meets the standard in section 208(a) merely
qualifies for a possible exercise of the Attorney General's discretion in granting asylum.
An alien who meets the section 243(h) standard, however, is automatically entitled to
the withholding of deportation. Id. at 1219. The Government also argued that BIA's
construction that the two standards were identical was entitled to substantial deference.
The Court rejected this argument, finding this issue was one of pure statutory construc-
tion. Id. at 1220-21.
36 Justice White and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
"7 Cardoza-Fonseca, 107 S. Ct. at 1225-26 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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accepted the argument of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) that:
One might conclude that a "well-founded fear of persecution,"
which requires a showing that persecution is likely to occur,
refers to a standard that is different from "a clear probability
of persecution," which requires a showing that persecution is
"more likely than not" to occur. As a practical matter, how-
ever, the facts in asylum and withholding cases do not produce
clear-cut instances in which such fine distinctions can be mean-
ingfully made. Our inquiry in these cases, after all, is not
quantitative, i.e., we do not examine a variety of statistics to
discern to some theoretical degree the likelihood of persecu-
tion. Rather our inquiry is qualitative: we examine the alien's
experiences and other external events tofdeternne if they are
of the kind that enable us to conclude the alien is likely to
become the victim of persecution. In this context, we find no
meaningful distinction between a standard requiring a showing
that persecution is likely to occur and a standard requinng
that persecution is more likely than not to occur. Accord-
ingly, we conclude that the standards for asylum and with-
holding of deportation are not meaningfully different, and, in
practical application, converge.'38
Justice Powell argued that if an alien could establish a basis for
his or her fear of persecution, he or she would usually be eligible
for relief under either statute. 139 Justice Powell believed the
majority erred in not understanding that the "well-founded"
language clearly required objective support of the alien's fear. 140
Nevertheless, according to the Cardoza-Fonseca decision, it
is clear that the standard required for determining claims for
political asylum under section 208(a) is different from the stan-
dard under section 243(h). The Court did not clearly articulate
how the section 208(a) standard is met, except that the "alien
need not prove that it is more likely than not that he or she will
be persecuted in his or her home country ",141 The Court found
"I Id. at 1226-27 (quoting In re Acosta, Interim Decision # 2986 (BIA Mar. 1,
1985)).
,39 Id. at 1227.
140 Id. at 1227-28.
"I Id. at 1222.
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the standard could only be given meaning through a "case by
case adjudication."'' 42 Apparently disturbed by the majority's
approach, Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion which
addressed the appropriate sources for determining the stan-
dard. 43 He argued that the agency should engage in "an exam-
ination of the subjective feelings of an applicant for asylum
coupled with an inquiry into the objective nature of the articu-
lated reasons for the fear "44 Of course, once the applicant has
met the lower standard of a well-founded fear of persecution,
he or she is only entitled to consideration for political asylum
by the Attorney General. In contrast, a favorable determination
under section 243(h) entitles the alien to remain m the United
States. 
4
1
B. The Clear Probability of Persecution Standard Under Section
243(h)
Prior to the United States' consent to the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 14 there was no
doubt that the standard governing whether an alien was eligible
for the withholding of deportation was a "clear probability of
persecution." 47 After the Protocol, 48 and particularly after the
passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, there was debate over
whether the clear probability standard was still applicable. 149 In
INS v Stevic, 150 the Supreme Court unanimously held "the 'clear
probability of persecution' standard remains applicable to §
243(h) withholding of deportation claims.' ' 5 1
Predrag Stevic, a citizen of Yugoslavia, entered the United
States in 1976 to visit his sister.5 2 Deportation proceedings began
after Stevic overstayed his visa. In December 1976, Stevic con-
142 Id. at 1221.
Id. at 1223 (Blackmun, J., concurnng).
'" Id. at 1223.
54 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982).
46 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577
, Stevic, 467 U.S. at 414-15.
,,' 19 U.S.T. 6223.
14 Id,. at 421-28.
-- 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
' Id. at 430.
5 Id. at 409-10.
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sented to voluntary departure within sixty days. In January 1977,
Stevic married an American citizen. His new wife filed a petition
for a visa which was approved. Five days after the marriage,
Mrs. Stevic was killed in an automobile accident and the visa
petition was automatically revoked. After being ordered to sur-
render for deportation, Stevic moved to reopen the deportaion
proceedings under section 243(h), stating that he had a well-
founded fear of persecution if he were returned to his home-
land. 5 3 The immigration judge denied the motion. The Board
of Immigration Appeals affirmed, finding that Stevic's claim
failed to demonstrate a clear probability of persecution.
154
The Supreme Court found the statutory language of section
243(h) did not specify how great the possibility of persecution
must be to qualify for the withholding of deportation. 155 Given
the "would" language of the statute, however, the Court in-
ferred that at least a likelihood of persecution was required.'
56
The Court also noted that section 243(h) did not refer to refugees
in its text or amended text and did not contain the "well-founded
fear" language of section 208(a).157 Consequently, the well-
founded fear of persecution standard is not applicable to a claim
under section 243(h). The question under this statute, the Court
stated, is whether "it is more likely than not that the alien would
be subject to persecution."'
' 5
Therefore, it is now settled that the section 243(h) clear
probability of persecution standard is a higher standard than the
well-founded fear of persecution standard of section 208(a). An
alien who meets the standard of section 243(h) will meet the
section 208(a) standard.' 59 The Supreme Court, however, has not
answered the question of whether these standards are in fact
meaningfully different. ir,
M Id. Stevic's fear was based upon his participation in an anti-commumst orgam-
zation after his marriage, and that his father-in-law had been imprisoned and ultimately
committed suicide in Yugoslavia. Id. at 410.
11, Id. at 411-12.
I Id. at 421-22.
156 Id. at 422.
Id. at 423-24.
Id. at 429-30.
M Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1985).
11o See infra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
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C. What Is Required to Meet the Standards Under Section
243(h) and Section 208(a)?
In order to qualify for relief under either section 208(a) or
section 243(h), an alien must be able to provide some objective
support for his or her claim. 61 Although there is no requirement
that an alien present documentary or corroborative support for
his or her fear, he or she must be able to show the reasonableness
of that fear.162 That showing will be judged, in actual practice,
on the basis of foreign policy considerations. This is because the
reasonableness of the claim is highly influenced by the State
Department in section 243(h) proceedings 6 3 and by the Attorney
General's ability to reject section 208(a) applications.'6 Thus,
foreign policy considerations, and in particular, ideological biases,
still enter into these decisions, despite the attempted neutrality
of the Refugee Act of 1980.
IV THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN ASYLUM CASES
Perhaps the best way to illustrate the role of ideology in
granting political asylum is to look at requests from selected
countries. An exanunation of the approval rate of asylum ap-
plications involving different countries reveals the probable role
of ideology in these decisions.
165
APPROVAL RATE APPROVAL RATE
COUNTRY (FY 1983-86) (FY 1987)
All Countries 23.3% 54.0%
161 This is true regardless of whether the standard is a clear probability of perse-
cution or a well-founded fear of persecution.
62 Diaz-Escobar v. INS, 782 F.2d 1488, 1492 (9th Cir. 1986) (alien must genuinely
fear persecution and there must be "credible, direct, and specific evidence" that the fear
is reasonable).
263 See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
'a 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982) states that the Attorney General may grant asylum if
the alien is a refugee within the meamng of d. at § 1101(a)(42)(A).
'6 The figures for Fiscal Years 1983-1986 are from U.S. CONMMIrEE FOR REFuGEEs,
DEsPrrE A GENERous SPIRIT: DENYING AsYLUM IN =r UNITED STATES (December 1986).
The Fiscal Year 1987 figures were prepared by Paul Soreff, a Louisville, Kentucky,
attorney involved in political asylum cases. Mr. Soreff compiled these statistics from the
monthly United States Immigration and Naturalization Reports of the United States
Committee for Refugees.
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Ethiopia 29.2% 47.3%
Lebanon 2.4% 26.4%
Poland 34.0% 47 4%
Romania 51.0% 597%
Haiti 1.8% .0%
Afghanistan 37 7% 26.2%
Iran 60.4% 67 4%
Nicaragua 14.0% 83.9%
El Salvador 2.6% 3.6%
Guatemala 0.9% 3.8%
As these rates indicate, 16 an alien fleeing from a communist
country or a regime not supported by the United States is far
more likely to be granted asylum than an alien fleeing from a
United States supported regime. 167 Given the role of the State
Department in the process of granting asylum, 168 this result is
not surprising.
A good example of the discriminatory treatment in the grant-
ing of political asylum is provided by the experience of refugees
from El Salvador 169 Salvadorans, apprehended by the INS, have
alleged they have been mistreated while in INS custody 170 In
addition, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees
17'
has informed the United States that it is not meeting its obli-
gations to Salvadoran refugees under the United Nations Pro-
6 Id.
167 Asylum rates for Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala for the first four
months of Fiscal Year 1988 dramatically illustrate this point. Nicaraguan refugees were
granted asylum in 8.3% of the cases, while Salvadorans were granted asylum in 4.4%
of the cases. Asylum was denied in all Guatemalan refugee cases. See id.
'" See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
'6 Helton, supra note 13, at 254.
'7 Comment, Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United
States, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 295, 296 (1985).
"I The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR)
was established in 1951 "to provide legal protection and material assistance to refugees
and to promote permanent solutions for refugee problems." U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
UNITED STATEs PARTicipATIN iN raB U.N.. REPORT BY Tim PRESIDENT TO TE CONGRESS
FOR THE YEAR 1985, at 141 (1986). This office spent $459.6 million for world-wide
refugee aid in 1985. Id. The office oversees many refugee projects and monitors refugee
issues through the publication of a monthly periodical entitled Refugees. The UNHCR
also intervenes in legal controversies concerning refugees. For example, the UNHCR
filed amicus curiae briefs with the Supreme Court in both Stevic and Cardoza-Fonseca.
Goodwin, Supreme Court Rules on Asylum, REFUGEEs, May 1987, at 8.
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tocol Relating to Refugees. 172 Why have refugees from El Salvador
been treated in this manner 9 Granting asylum to large numbers
of Salvadoran refugees would be inconsistent with the Umted
States position that the government of El Salvador is improving
its record of human rights violations. 173 The practical effect of
this situation is that refugees from El Salvador must have well-
documented evidence to support their claim for asylum.174 As a
practical matter, it is not reasonable to expect refugees, fleeing
for their lives, to have this documentation. 75 The result is that
most Salvadoran refugees will not be able to prove their claims
and will routinely be demed asylum. 76
Ideology is not the only explanation for the difference in
treatment given to refugees from different countries. There are
also explanations which relate to domestic concerns in the United
States . 77
V DomsTIc CONSIDERATIONS IN ASYLUM CASES
Throughout history, the United States has been able to con-
trol its borders: it was rarely a place of first refuge and it could
select its refugees. 7 8 In recent years, however, the situation has
changed. Refugees increasingly come directly to the United States
from Central America and the Caribbean Islands.' 79 With the popu-
172 Specifically, Salvadorans were not being given an adequate opportunity to apply
for asylum. Comment, supra note 172, at 297.
171 Helton, supra note 13, at 254. There may be other explanations for not granting
refugee status to Salvadorans, such as concern with not encouraging further refugees.
See infra notes 179-93 and accompanying text. In general, the government of Canada
has been far more receptive than the United States to Central American refugees,
particularly to Salvadorans. The total number of refugees seeking asylum in Canada has
been small despite Canadian policy of not sending refugees away once they are inside
Canada. Billard, Canada: Influx of Salvadorans, REFuGEES, Mar. 1987, at 14. In the
face of increasing numbers of refugees from Central America, it will be interesting to
see if Canada retreats from this policy.
174 Helton, supra note 13, at 254.
,73 Id. at 255-56.
176 Id. at 254.
I" See infra notes 180-93 and accompanying text.
,74 Scanlan, supra note 10, at 858.
171 Id. For example, m 1984, the INS apprehended more than 1.2 million illegal
aliens, which reflected a 34% increase over a 2-year period. The estimated number of
illegal aliens in the U.S. vanes from 2-4 million persons. M. LEMAY, supra note 1, at
15, 123.
1987-88]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
lation of illegal aliens growing by as much as 500,000 each year, the
United States has clearly lost control of its borders. 80
The most visible proof of this fact was seen in the 1980
Mariel Boat Lift.' 8 1 More than 130,000 Cuban refugees arrived
in the United States within a five-month period, 8 2 shattering the
illusion that the United State could control its borders. 83 Al-
though the Carter Administration generally welcomed the Cu-
bans, 84 the Reagan Administration has taken a hard-line approach
to asylum claims of people fleeing to the United States from
Cuba, Haiti, or Central America. 8 5 President Reagan has stressed
the importance of having the authonty to decide who qualifies
for refugee status.
8 6
This hard-line approach could be observed during the sum-
mer of 1981 when the Reagan Administration announced a
policy of alien detention.8 7 Prior to this time, illegal aliens were
routinely released unless they represented a security risk or were
likely to abscond.ies The new policy, however, placed illegal
aliens in detention until their admissibility to the United States
was determined. 8 9 This policy ultimately was upheld by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Jean
v Nelson.90
0 Giuliani, The Immigration Program of the Reagan Administration, 36 U. Mi"u.
L. REv 807 (1981-82).
"I1 Scanlan, supra note 10, at 859.
182 Id.
"I Id. at 858.
114 Id. at 850.
I" Helton, supra note 13, at 256-57
116 U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy, 17 WEEKLY Compr. PRas. Doc. 829 (July
30, 1981). More recently, Secretary of State George Schultz stated:
I have the greatest respect for those who say that the United States should
do even more for I know their sentiment reflects the fundamental
value Americans place on helping others in need. This goal, however,
must be realized within the framework of an international system of
authority and responsibility. Humane first-asylum practices are the respon-
sibility of the entire family of civilized nations, but they are implemented
under the sovereign authority of each nation state to establish its own
immigration policy and to control its own borders,
Statement by Secretary Schultz, supra note 1, at 52 (emphasis added).
"I Helton, supra note 13, at 256.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 256-57
,' 711 F.2d 1455, 1509 (11th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
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Commentators have attempted to explain the new approach
by referring to the political views of the Reagan Administration
as harsh and discriminatory 191 Such characterization, however,
is probably too simplistic. The problems facing the Umted States
at its borders are new and formidable, and certainly do not lend
themselves to ready solutions.
VI. SHOULD ASYLUM CLAIMS BE PROCESSED WITHOUT
REFERENCE TO POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 9
There is probably no way to remove political ideology from
the political asylum process. Ultimately, the granting of a refu-
gee's claim for asylum is the recogition that the refugee's home
country has treated, or is likely to treat, its own citizen in an
unfair and improper manner. Clearly, this is an explicit political
value judgment. The issue, then, is how this judgment should
be made.
One author argues that tis decision should be made by
courts which would determine the degree and kind of harm a
foreign government inflicts upon its citizens.'92 Since courts rou-
tinely make these kinds of inquiries, judges should be able to
determine the relevant facts.193 The more difficult issue, however,
is the kind of harm that is illegitimate.' 94 One possible standard
is that a legitimate government action is an exercise of power in
the interest of its citizens and not in the interest of its leaders
or a small group of citizens.195 Judges should make the decisions
based on the general condition of the country and on the par-
ticular circumstances of the refugee. 196
The above standard may effectuate the goals of the Refugee
Act of 1980. First, such a standard would lessen the role of the
-' The Haitians were the first black refugees to seek asylum in any great number,
and they were treated differently than any other refugees. Bruck, Springing the Haitians,
AM. LAW., Sept. 1982, at 35. In addition, the Haitians were generally unskilled in the
workforce. This is in contrast to refugees like the Vietnamese, who were well-educated
and members of the old Vietnamese middle class. M. LEMAY, supra note 1, at 115.
'9 Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law of Political Asylum, 99 HA v L. Rav
450, 465 (1985).
193 Id.
1' Id.
195 Id.
' Id. at 468-71.
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Executive Branch in the asylum process. If judges were to make
the factual determinations related to the legitimacy of political
institutions, the role of the State Department would change.
Although the department might still have a role, such as giving
the government information about a given nation, a judge could
balance that information against information from other sources.
As it now stands, the State Department's opinion is often deci-
sive in the asylum determination.1 97
Second, the above standard for legitmacy or illegitimacy of
governmental action would more fairly grant asylum to those
persons who observe it the most. The present system favors
those fleeing communist governments and is unfair to aliens
fleeing right-wing, oppressive regimes.
Third, making decisions with reference to the general con-
ditions in a country would make the asylum process fairer For
example, the fact that all or most citizens of a given country are
subject to persecution should be a major factor in proving that
a specific individual is likely to be persecuted.198
There are ways to improve the fairness of the asylum process.
As the United States faces an increasing number of refugees,
however, the focus may change from how to deal with refugees
to how to ensure political and economic stability in our own
hemisphere. Such a focus might help to alleviate the underlying
causes of refugees.
CONCLUSION
Passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 was a landmark event
in United States' refugee law Its promise of a neutral process
for the consideration of asylum claims was a bold step in the
movement toward human rights and human freedom. Yet its
promise remains unfulfilled as political ideology continues to
govern claims for asylum, and the United States continues to
face the problem of being a nation of first refuge. If asylum
197 See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text.
I" As the law stands now, an alien must show specific hardship and allege specific
facts related to him or her. The alien cannot make general assertions based upon a
country's overall violence or persecution. See, e.g., Kaveh-Haghigy v. INS, 783 F.2d
1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1986).
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decisions could be made by courts free of Umted States foreign
policy considerations, however, the goal of the Refugee Act of
1980 may be reached.
Davalene Cooper

